原产地规则、贸易保护与市场进入模式Rules of Origin,Trade Protection and Market Access Modes
陈建隆;李建成;
摘要(Abstract):
本文建立一个国际双寡头模型,分析原产地规则对非成员企业市场进入模式的影响。将中间产品部门纳入模型,采用本地含量要求作为原产地的判断标准,本文分析了非成员企业如何在出口但不满足原产地标准、出口且满足原产地标准、对外直接投资三种市场进入模式中进行选择,进而探讨了提高原产地标准和贸易自由化对非成员企业市场进入模式的影响。结果表明:若疏于考虑提高原产地标准对非成员企业市场进入模式的影响,则成员政府可能会高估提高原产地标准的保护效果,甚至误将伤害成员企业利益的政策当成保护政策;虽然贸易自由化会强化原产地规则在防止关税规避上的功能,但却会削弱其在吸引FDI上的作用。
关键词(KeyWords): 原产地规则;贸易保护;出口;对外直接投资
基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金面上项目“外来人口给城市带来了什么?基于异质性劳动力区位选择效应视角的研究”(71874214);国家自然科学基金青年项目“交通基础设施建设对企业绩效的微观影响机制:机理研究与实证检验”(71703043)
作者(Author): 陈建隆;李建成;
Email:
DOI: 10.13510/j.cnki.jit.2020.12.002
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- (1)多数FTA承诺在5-15年内完全消除其内部关税。例如,北美自由贸易区(NAFTA)要求其大部分产业在5年内达成内部关税归零的目标,然而在某些敏感产业,如农业,NAFTA花了15年才完全消除其内部关税。
- (1)他们没有明确采用的原产地标准,因为他们的建模策略是比较原产地规则的存在与否对非成员企业定价行为的影响,并据此探讨原产地规则的市场分割效果。
- (2)假设企业I和企业O进行伯特兰德竞争并不会影响本文的结果,计算结果可登陆对外经济贸易大学学术刊物部网站“刊文补充数据查询”栏目查阅、下载。
- (1)可以更具一般性地假设最终产品企业生产一个单位的产品需要使用Kj>0 (j∈{I,O})个单位的中间产品,但这并不会改变模型的结果。
- (2)由于FTA成员经常针对不同产业或产品制订不同的原产地规则,因此本文采用部分均衡模型来分析原产地规则的经济效应。
- (3)假设t1和t2足够大,使得在均衡时,pO1≤pO2+t1及pO2≤pO1+t2成立,因而不存在套利空间。
- (1)增加值定义要求使用FTA内部生产的中间产品价值超过一个固定比例θv:=mIpIm(mIpIm+mOpOm),其中,分母是中间产品的总价值,分子是从FTA进口的中间产品价值。
- (1)虽然wO增加也会提高满足原产地标准模式的生产成本,但是相较于不满足原产地标准,提升的幅度较小,因为在此模式下,企业O仅是部分地使用FTA外部的中间产品。
- (2)为了确保三种市场进入模式同时存在,图3是在θ=0.4、τ=0.75、t1=0.25、t2=0.1、F=2、α=0.2的假设下画出。在三种市场进入模式同时存在的参数范围内,本文结论均成立。
- (1)其他参数分别是τ=0.75、t1=0.25、t2=0.1、F=2、α=0.2。
- (2)FTA利用率有两种常用的测量方法,一是享有优惠关税的出口额占成员出口至其他成员出口总额的比重;二是利用原产地证书出口的厂商数占成员所有出口厂商数的比重。